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I. Introduction 
 
A. Intergovernmental sphere 
 
When looking at the envisaged procedure of norm-setting in the realm of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the closure of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 
and the finalisation in terms of substance of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(TCE)1 one has to observe, supposing that the TCE is going to enter into force, that this traditional 
field of intergovernmental cooperation faces fewer changes in this respect than one might have 
expected. Decision-making in the Council remains dominated by the principle of unanimity. The 
weak position of the Commission and the European Parliament is preserved, thus reinforcing 
instead of mitigating key aspects that are often cited in the continuous lamentations on the EU’s 
democratic deficit. The complete exclusion of judicial review by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in the field of CFSP2 illustrates the weight of national interests wanting to preserve as much 
sovereignty and autonomy as possible with regard to decision-making in external and security 
affairs.3 
In sharp contrast to the detected lack of innovative approaches concerning the norm-setting 
process, one may identify significant modifications when it comes to the legal effects which may 
originate from the future Constitution in the field of CFSP. They stem, above all, from the proposed 
merger of the pillars which will lead to a likely ‘watering down’ of the established principle of 
supremacy of Community law over Union law.4 A similar effect derives from the principles 
contained in Article III-308 TCE. These revisions lay the ground for a considerable extension of 
legal competences in the realm of the CFSP. However, for reasons of brevity this author will refrain 
from elaborating on this point any further. 
                                                          
1 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was adopted by the 25 Heads of State and Government in 
Brussels on 17 and 18 June 2004. It is based on an initial draft prepared by the European Convention and presented to 
the Thessaloniki European Council on 20 June 2003 (D-TCE). Having been adopted by the Heads of State and 
Government, the Constitution will be signed and then ratified by each Member State in line with its own constitutional 
arrangements (i.e. by parliamentary procedure and/or by referendum). The Constitution will not take effect until it has 
been ratified by the 25 Member States. 
2 See Smith (2001) pp. 79-104 (92). 
3 Views exist which claim that the competences of the ECJ in the sphere of CFSP have been partially extended in the 
framework of the Constitution. Following Article III-376 TCE “the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance 
with Article III-308 and to rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article III-
365(4),  reviewing the legality of  European decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons 
adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter II of Title V.” However it is important to note, that these competences 
existed already in the realm of Community law, so that one may only speak of a shift of legal grounds for ECJ 
competence from the former first pillar to the sphere of CFSP, which in effect does not entail an extension of rights with 
regard to the ECJ.  
4 The assumption that EC law prevails over EU law has been confirmed by the ECJ’s jurisdiction in Leifer, Werner and 
Centro-Com. See Case C-83/94, Leifer, [1995] ECR I-3231; Case C-70/94, Werner I, [1995] ECR I-3189; Case C-
124/95, Centro-Com, [1997] ECR I-81. A different view is presented by Wessel (2000), pp. 1135-1171. 
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Despite the projected abolition of the pillar structure and the more coherent pooling of 
existing policy fields with regard to external action, the Constitution does not abandon the 
intergovernmental characteristic of CFSP, since procedural requirements such as the unanimity 
principle remain applicable. On the contrary, the intergovernmental aspect will even gain 
momentum due to the new institutional quality of the European Council together with its additional 
decision-making competences and the introduction of specific rights to take initiatives allocated to 
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. From a legal perspective, the danger of abusive 
intergovernmentalism is limited by the principle of the single institutional framework and the 
principle of coherence as enacted in Article 3 TEU. The former aims at establishing a balanced 
coordination between the supranational sphere and intergovernmental policy fields, while the latter 
implies the obligation for compatibility or absence of contradiction and synergy. In other words, in 
the context of EU law “coherence” signifies intensified efforts of coordination among the Member 
States and the institutions “towards creating the objective of an integrated whole, that is, to ensure 
that the EU acts in unisono.”5 According to the Treaty of Nice, the Commission and the Council 
must both together ensure compliance with the principle of coherence.6 In the Constitution this is 
the responsibility of the Commission and the European Minister for Foreign Affairs (Article III-292 
para 3 TCE). This means that the institutions mentioned above must always examine the 
admissibility of measures of flexibility in reference to the respective article on coherence. Any 
further check against more specific conditions of flexibility may only be envisaged provided that 
concerns related to the principle of coherence can be excluded.7  
 
B. The obstacle of unanimity 
 
The objective of giving the Union a more effective and rapid profile in external action is to a 
great extent hampered by the general condition of unanimous decision-making in this field. 
Exceptions from this condition are granted on the basis of Article 23 para 2 TEU, in cases where the 
Council on the basis of a common strategy is going to decide upon a common action, a common 
position or another decision or if it takes a decision to implement these instruments or to nominate a 
special representative following Article 18 para 5 TEU. However, decisions having military or 
defence implications are entirely excluded from qualified majority voting. The principle of 
unanimity is going to remain after the entry into force of the Constitution. The IGC failed again to 
overcome the impasse of restricted qualified majority voting in the realm of CFSP and ESDP 
                                                          
5 See Blanck (2003) p. 13, 
6 Generally on the question of coherence in the EU see, among others, Tjetje (1997) pp. 211-234; Wessel (1999) 
particularly pp. 295-314; Missiroli (2001) pp. 177-196. 
7 It has to be noted that the principle of coherence is repeated in the catalogue of specific conditions governing 
flexibility; see Article 27a para 1 (3) TEU. 
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(Article III-201 para 4 TCE). Against this background, the additional option for qualified majority 
voting, namely “on a proposal which the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs has presented 
following a specific request to him or her from the European Council, made on its own initiative or 
that of the Minister” does not substantially improve the situation (Article III-300 para 2b TCE). 
 
C. Alliances and national preferences in terms of security and defence  
 
As well as having been left beyond the remit of the Community’s legal order until the Treaty 
of Maastricht, Security and Defence Policy are also shaped by various defence traditions, 
membership of various alliances and by concern to maintain a status of neutrality or non-alignment. 
Due to the closeness and centrality of Security and Defence Policy to the closely guarded area of 
national security, these issues are the subject of much debate in day-to-day foreign policy making 
and practice at various levels.8 Eleven out of the former EU-15 are full members of NATO and two 
are not integrated militarily into the alliance (Spain and France). The other four EU-members 
(Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Finland) are neutral or non-aligned States. Following the last 
enlargement eight (out of ten) new Member States have joined the Union as NATO members 
(Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Baltic States). This gives additional 
weight to the “Atlanticists” in the Council, nourishing fears of squeezing out the formerly 
influential group of the so-called “Continentalists”. This refers above all to France, which has 
traditionally pursued a policy aimed at emancipation from the NATO. Furthermore, the continuous 
political adherence to the (presumed) status of neutrality is increasingly coming to be exposed as 
somewhat contradictory given the changing nature of threats to international security and the full 
commitment to the implementation of the CFSP to which all Member States are subject.9 A 
comprehensive solidarity clause contained in the Constitution (Article I-15 TCE), similar to that 
enacted in Article 11 para 2 TEU, figures as the only legal remedy on the EU level seeking to 
balance the panoply of national foreign policy programs. 
The question however arises then of how this self-binding provision can be effectively put 
into practice in day-to-day business. This problem is aggravated by the manifest lack of any 
mechanisms providing for control or sanction in order to respond to potential or evident breaches. 
This is illustrated by the fact that numerous infringements of the principle of solidarity have 
occurred in the past without ever incurring any legal protest. The potential risks for the Union’s 
external profile resulting from too much internal division on how to react to external events may be 
disastrous.  
 
                                                          
8 See Brill (2003) p. 549. 
9 The only exception is Denmark; see Protocol nr. 5 on the position of Denmark. 
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D. Unity or efficiency? 
 
Against the picture drawn above one may deduce that the Union will have to assert its 
external role by striking a balance between intergovernmental cooperation, the principle of 
unanimity and national adherence to either alliances or to the status of neutrality. Taking all these 
factors into consideration would respect the unity of the EU’s external action, but in the majority of 
cases it would also mean reducing the result to the lowest common denominator.  
Cooperation outside the Treaty framework may constitute an alternative. Another would be 
to use mechanisms of flexibility which enable interested Member States to advance the CFSP 
within the institutional setting of the Union without having to involve all Member States. Thus it 
should be possible to unite the most progressive members under a legal umbrella in order to boost 
the external profile of the Union and, at the same time, to prevent the creation of exclusive clubs. 
However, the scope of enhanced cooperation in the field of CFSP is constrained 
considerably by a detailed catalogue of conditions set out in Article 43 TEU and the legal restriction 
to exclusively implement joint actions or joint positions. The explicit exclusion of measures having 
military or defence implications cuts off the possibility of building coalitions within the European 
legal order in times of crisis. Against this background, there are prominent voices pointing at the 
potential benefits stemming from enhanced cooperation in the realm of the ESDP, particularly with 
regard to the implementation of the Petersberg tasks.10 Opponents of a flexible Europe refer to the 
risk of enhancing the Union’s operability “at the costs of splitting it”, arguing that introducing 
flexibility into the realm of CFSP equates to a self-made “disempowerment of the Union in external 
relations”.11 To rebut this argument it is enough to acknowledge that any form of flexibility within 
the CFSP always has to represent the Union in its entirety.12 Nonetheless a dilemma emerges, since 
any measure of flexibility is only applicable if a unified reaction has not been reached in the 
Council. It is more than questionable as to whether it will ever be possible to disguise a lack of 
internal concordance with a seemingly unified appearance in external action. However, the risks of 
paralysing the external profile of the Union are much more ominous if decision making within 
CFSP remained exclusively based on unanimity. 
The above-mentioned limitations to enhanced cooperation prompted the Working Group on  
“Defence” of the European Convention to address the issue of flexibility, despite the fact that it was 
                                                          
10 See CONFER 4760/00, 4. 
11 Quoted in Bender (2001) p. 753 [translation by the author]. 
12 This argument however, raises the question whether due to the principle of collective representation, the European 
Union as a whole also assumes international responsibility for breaches of international law as well as contractual and 
non-contractual liability for damages caused by the group of Member States participating in enhanced cooperation. This 
problem, which is closely linked to the issue of international responsibility of international organisations, cannot be 
elaborated on any further within the framework of this paper, however the author pleads that at least a subsidiary 
responsibility with regard to the European Union be considered. 
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not granted particular attention in neither the Laeken mandate nor in the framework of a specific 
Working Group within the structure of the Convention. In their final report a number of explicit 
recommendations reflect the particular importance finally attributed to flexibility, namely:  
“ensuring flexibility in decision-making and in action, both through more 
extensive use of constructive abstention and through the setting-up of a specific 
form of closer cooperation between those Member States wishing to carry out 
the most demanding Petersberg tasks and having the capabilities needed for 
that commitment to be credible13“  
The essential impetus leading to this document was expressed by the Franco-German 
contribution to the ESDP, in which it was explicitly demanded: “Notre objectif est d'atteindre une 
plus grande flexibilité, notamment dans le domaine des processus décisionnels“14. In addition, the 
contribution requested the transformation of the ESDP into a “European Security and Defence 
Union” through, amongst other things, the extension of enhanced cooperation to the second pillar 
and its establishment by qualified majority voting, as well as to reduce the quantitative threshold for 
participation. By contrast, the final report of the Working Group on defence put the focus on 
alternative measures of flexibility such as “closer cooperation”. Yet it was only after Europe’s 
political division about the war on Iraq and the signal set by the four-nations proposal of 29 April 
2003 involving Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, that the European discussion on 
enhanced cooperation was eventually re-animated. The underpinning objective, however, was to 
avoid the formation of any avant garde on European security issues operating outside the Treaties. 
To this end, the presidency of the Convention issued a comprehensive document proposing a range 
of legal revisions and additional normative options with regard to flexible integration in the 
CFSP/ESDP.15 Finally a breakthrough was reached in the Draft Constitution by overcoming the 
existing constraints of enhanced cooperation. Furthermore, specific instruments governing closer, 
structured and armament cooperation found their way into the Constitution. These newly created 
mechanisms significantly increase the range of possibilities to act, as well as the degree of 
complexity. 
 
Against the background of a selective analysis of existing forms of flexibility, this 
contribution intends to elaborate on the instrument of enhanced cooperation and the newly shaped 
specific mechanisms of flexible integration. On the basis of both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe of 18 July 2004 (CIG 87/04), these instruments will be 
analysed from a legal perspective. In order to complete the picture, scenarios of factual and 
                                                          
13 See CONV 461/02, 2. 
14 See CONV 422/02, nr. 2. 
15 See CONV 723/03. 
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potential cooperation outside the Treaty framework will be taken into equal consideration. It will be 
shown in the end that the range of options, from (ad-hoc) mechanisms in the framework of 
enhanced cooperation to new forms of pre-defined and even permanent flexibility, are promising to 
boost the profile of CFSP and ESDP. However, whether they will effectively contribute to and urge 
the extension go integration process can only be judged based on future practice. 
In the following sections, two examples of existing forms of Treaty-based flexibility will be 
assessed in more detail.   
 
II. Examples of flexible integration in the CFSP 
 
A. Constructive abstention (Article 23 para. 1 TEU) 
 
The instrument of constructive abstention allows single Member States to abstain from 
voting in the framework of the CFSP without hampering the unanimous decision-making process. 
Thus it is designed to provide a flexible alternative to fully blocking decisions requiring unanimity. 
With reference to Article 23 para 1 TEU, a Member State is authorised to make a formal 
declaration, which means that it will not have to apply the decision, while accepting that the Union 
as such is bound by it. The respective Member State is also obliged, in a spirit of mutual solidarity 
to “refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision 
and the other Member States shall respect its position.” If several Member States that amount to 
more than one third of the weighted votes, take recourse to constructive abstention, a decision does 
ipso iure not materialise. 
When it appeared in the Treaty of Maastricht for the first time, this measure was welcomed 
as an adequate remedy to the rigid principle of unanimity in the CFSP. Nonetheless, its existence 
encapsulates a general dilemma. Any application of constructive abstention by one or more Member 
States reveals the ostensible lack of approval with regard to specific matters in this field. In turn, a 
majority of at least two thirds of the weighted votes is required for successful decision-making. 
Constructive abstention is not so much a potential measure of flexibility, as a more organisational 
element of decision-making. Moreover, it is not designed as a general escape clause for cases of 
conflict between Union law and national politics. To illustrate this concern, one may evoke the 
scenario of a neutral country which tries to regularly avoid participation in the field of ESDP by 
taking recourse to constructive abstention. Such an approach would not only run counter the 
comprehensive acceptance of the acquis as signed at the moment of accession to the Union, but it 
would also infringe on both the solidarity clause enacted in Article 11 para 2 TEU and the principle 
of good faith as a fundamental principle of international public law. However, it must be 
emphasised that any Member State which cannot or does not want to agree with a decision requiring 
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unanimity is not obliged to make use of constructive abstention. It never foregoes its right to 
prevent such a decision by using a veto.16  
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has also adopted the option of 
constructive abstention. However, the wording changed slightly, clearly illustrating the general 
endeavour to link voting majorities with quantitative thresholds. Thus, in other words, a decision 
will not be adopted if “the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent 
at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union” 
(Article III-300 para 1 TCE). 
 
B. Opt-out by Denmark 
 
In the course of the negotiations following the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht and the 
rejection of the Treaty by the population of Denmark in a popular referendum, Denmark was 
granted a specific opt-out clause enacted in Protocol nr. 5 on the position of Denmark. Based on the 
so-called “Edinburgh-compromise” Denmark also received exceptional abstention rights in the field 
of ESDP and JHA. Since the content of the Treaty of Maastricht partially touched upon the issue of 
national sensibilities, this derogation arrangement constituted the last chance at that moment and 
paved the way for the Treaty’s entrance into force. In the following, the protocol was incorporated 
into primary law by means of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In part two it is stated:  
“With regard to measures adopted by the Council in the field of Articles 13(1) 
and 17 of the Treaty on European Union, Denmark does not participate in the 
elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union 
which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of closer 
cooperation between Member States in this area. Therefore Denmark shall not 
participate in their adoption. Denmark shall not be obliged to contribute to the 
financing of operational expenditure arising from such measures.” 
Thus Denmark, which has met any attempt of creating integrated EU military structures with 
open scepticism, is not obliged to participate either politically or financially to this kind of 
operations. In return, it retains the liberty to inform the other Member States at any time that it does 
not want to avail itself of all or of parts of the protocol and that it intends to fully apply the relevant 
measures within the framework of the European Union. 
The Protocol on the specific position of Denmark has been entirely introduced into the 
Constitution.  
 
                                                          
16 See Council of the European Union, Decision making and constructive abstention in defence matters, 30.08.2001, 
Doc. 11377/01. 
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In the light of the examples explored above, one may note that mechanisms of flexible 
integration have already been an integral part and stabilising element of the emerging Common 
Foreign and Defence Policy. In the longer run, however, it seems risky to build the concept of a 
more integrated and more operative CFSP and ESDP exclusively on the principle of constructive 
abstention and specific derogation regimes or on regular recourse to coordination outside the Treaty 
framework. The introduction of enhanced cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam initiated a 
process to meet these considerations and has further developed through the Treaty of Nice. The 
proposals contained in the future Constitution finally mark the turning point in primary law, ranging 
from temporary constructions of flexibility towards the even establishment of permanent 
institutionalised systems based on extended mandates. 
 
III. Enhanced cooperation in the CFSP 
 
A. Enhanced cooperation in general (Article 43-45 TEU) 
 
The Treaty of Nice enshrined for the first time general provisions on enhanced cooperation 
applicable across all pillars. Before Nice, the Treaty of Amsterdam already provided legal grounds 
for enhanced cooperation. These were, however, restricted to the Community pillar (Article 11 
TEC) and to the third pillar (Article 40 TEU). The field of CFSP affairs was reduced to alternative 
mechanisms such as constructive abstention according to Article 23 para. 1(2) TEU or closer 
cooperation in the realm of security (but outside the Treaties) according to Article 17 para. 4 TEU. 
Against this background, Articles 43 to 45 TEU in the Nice version, contain the first horizontal 
clause of primary law which entirely encompasses both the supranational and the intergovernmental 
legal sphere of the European Union. However, the Treaty of Nice did not fundamentally reform the 
context of enhanced cooperation, although new provisions were introduced in order to render future 
use of the mechanism more attractive. Article 43 TEU limits the required threshold of participating 
countries to start such a cooperation to eight Member States, which constitutes less than one third in 
the enlarged Union. The existing veto rights, which were created by the Treaty of Amsterdam, are 
lifted in the first and third pillar. By contrast, as will be shown in the following section, the scope of 
effective implementation within the CFSP (Articles 27 a-e TEU) became subject to significant 
limitations.  
The relationship between the general provisions of Articles 43 to 45 TEU and the specific 
rules governing enhanced cooperation in the CFSP might be qualified as a “specific order of cross-
references”17. This is impressively illustrated by Article 27a para 2 TEU that states: “Articles 11 to 
                                                          
17 See Kaufmann-Bühler in Grabitz/Hilf  (2003), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 22. Ergänzungslieferung, August 
2003, Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 27a – 27e TEU, para 4. 
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27 and Articles 27b to 28 shall apply to the enhanced cooperation provided for in this article, save 
as otherwise provided in Article 27c and Articles 43 to 45“. This means that in the field of CFSP 
the general norms, which are applicable to enhanced cooperation in all pillars subsequent to Title 
VII TEU, are subordinate to the more specific ones. By contrast, following Article 27a para. 1 TEU, 
enhanced cooperation in the CFSP will safeguard the values and serve the interest of the EU as a 
whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene. Furthermore, it has to 
respect the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the CFSP, as well as the 
decisions taken within this policy, the powers of the European Community and consistency between 
all the Union’s policies and external activities. In turn, the application of the general rules contained 
in Articles 43-45 TEU are confined by the prevailing acquis communautaire and the principles of 
unity and consistency. 
 
B. Enhanced cooperation in the CFSP (Article 27 a – e TEU) 
 
At the beginning of the IGC 2000 leading to the Treaty of Nice, extending enhanced 
cooperation to the realm of the second pillar was a non-issue.18 It took the Member States until the 
European Council summit in Feira in June 2000 to officially add it to the common agenda.19 
However, the provisions introducing enhanced cooperation into the CFSP constitute nothing more 
than a thin compromise. A number of constraints, which have been added at the request of the UK, 
Ireland and Sweden, added to its complexity and reduced the potential to effectively exploit the 
opportunities offered by the mechanism of enhanced cooperation.20  
Firstly, the veto “for important and stated reasons of national policy” which had been lifted 
in the first and in the third pillar has been inserted into second pillar matters (Article 27c; Article 23 
para 2 (2) TEU); secondly, enhanced cooperation in the CFSP will only relate to the implementation 
of a joint action or a common position (Article 27b TEU) and thirdly, all matters having military or 
defence implications are excluded from its application (Article 27b TEU). The later limitation does 
not, in the light of Article 17 para 1 (3) TEU, extend to (enhanced) cooperation between Member 
States in the field of armaments. Based on a strict terminological interpretation, procurement and 
coordination in the field of armaments are obviously related to defence. However, armaments are 
relevant with reference to commercial, social and further EC-related policies, including issues such 
                                                          
18 The so-called Amsterdam left-overs are summarised in the “Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of 
enlargement of the European Union” appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam. They refer to the size and composition of 
the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the 
Council, as well as other necessary amendments to the Treaties arising as regards the European institutions in 
connection with the above issues and in implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
19 See Fischer (2003) pp. 53 seq. 
20 See Stubb (2002) pp.130 seq. 
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as competition, merger-control or subsidies in the industrial sector.21 Against this background one 
may argue, that enhanced cooperation in the field of armaments cooperation does not infringe on 
Article 27b TEU. 
 
C. Enhanced cooperation in the Draft Constitution (Article I-44 TCE; Article III-416 – 
III-423 TCE) 
 
Even though enhanced cooperation has never been practically applied to date, it has been 
further developed within the framework of the European Convention leading to an extension of its 
scope as laid down in the Draft Constitution. The legal bases governing enhanced cooperation do 
not follow any systematic design but are deliberately spread between the first and the third part of 
the Draft Constitution. Moreover they are subdivided into general and specific norms, whereby the 
principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali has to be applied. However, in cases of legal conflict 
or lack of normative clarity one has to have recourse to the general norms of enhanced cooperation 
or even to those governing CFSP as such. 
Similarly to the current Treaty version, the instrument of enhanced cooperation, which is 
unconditionally open to all Member States, “shall aim to further the objectives of the Union, to 
protect its interests and reinforce its integration process” (Article I-44 TCE). Its establishment will 
only be authorised by the Council “as a last resort” after proving that the pursued objectives cannot 
be realised “within a reasonable period” by the Union as a whole. In addition, the Union’s Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and the Commission are entitled to issue opinions on the proposed enhanced 
cooperation’s consistency with the CFSP and other Union policies. The European Parliament must 
be informed. In order to initiate the procedure of enhanced cooperation, at least one third of the 
Member States must agree to work together. 
Compared to the current Treaty regime, the proposed procedure is less cumbersome and 
restrictive. Above all, enhanced cooperation might be established in all policy areas, except the field 
of exclusive competences.22 In the realm of the CFSP, the limitation to solely implementing joint 
actions or common positions has been abolished, together with the explicit exclusion of matters 
having military or defence implications. In other words, the general rules governing enhanced 
cooperation unconditionally apply to the CFSP as well. Slight procedural differences persist when it 
comes to initiating the procedure or with regard to the admission of Member States wishing to join 
the mechanism at a later stage.23 
                                                          
21 See Trybus (2004) pp.189-217 (193). 
22 Exclusive competences are competition policy, monetary policy, common commercial policy, customs union and the 
conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; Article I-12 para 1 TCE. 
23 See Article III-325 para 1 and 2 TCE. 
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When looking more closely at the correlation between the trans-pillar regime of enhanced 
cooperation anchored in Article I-44 TCE and the specific mechanisms of flexibility in the field of 
ESDP, one has to differentiate between both concepts. The only legal basis effectively referring to 
enhanced cooperation is to be found in Article III-213 paragraph 5 of the original Draft Constitution 
dealing with “structured cooperation”, thus establishing there again a hierarchical order based on 
cross-references. However, this provision has been dropped in the later version.24 Similarly, the 
other mechanisms of flexibility, such as that of closer cooperation, the execution of civil or military 
operations by groups of Member States or active participation within the European defence agency 
do not relate to enhanced cooperation at all. They fall within the legal ambit of the general norms of 
CFSP and particularly ESDP, laid down in Articles I-40 and I-41 TCE. However, the opportunities 
offered by these mechanisms do not preclude the application of enhanced cooperation as such in the 
realm of foreign and security policy. Nonetheless, it is apparent that due to the specific mechanisms, 
potential issues for enhanced cooperation in the field of CFSP are limited in number. Related 
initiatives may be considered with regard to civil measures or aspects of human rights protection. 
 
IV. Normative and institutional conditions for enhanced cooperation 
 
A. Conditions for establishing enhanced cooperation in the CFSP 
 
Basic conditions in the CFSP 
Contrary to the detailed catalogue of general criteria contained in Articles 43-45 TEU, 
specific conditions for enhanced cooperation in the field of CFSP are practically almost totally 
lacking. In order to close this gap, a complex system of cross-references has been introduced into 
the Treaty. According to Article 27a TEU, the most important article in this respect, a number of 
fundamental objectives with regard to external relations must be observed, namely the safeguard of 
European values and the commitment to assert the Union’s identity as a coherent force on the 
international scene. By reference in paragraph 2 to the general objectives of CFSP contained in 
Articles 11 et seq. TEU, the obligation to support and maintain a unified European profile in 
international affairs, gains additional substance. In turn, the Council’s competence to assess whether 
the above-mentioned obligations are successfully honoured confers significant discretionary powers 
to this body. With regard to internal policies, enhanced cooperation in the CFSP has to preserve the 
common acquis and to respect the principle of consistency within the second pillar and within the 
sphere of Union policies as a whole. To this end the CFSP has to be understood in its entirety as 
                                                          
24 See CIG 60/03 ADD 1, Annex 22, according to which the structured cooperation shall be established as a permanent 
mechanism, whereby the reference to enhanced cooperation has been dropped. 
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shaped by the (European) Council, thus equally encompassing respective guidelines, strategic 
principles or specific decisions. In other words, action in the framework of enhanced cooperation 
does not only have to consider respective Treaty obligations but also has to respect results 
originating from political developments as, for example, laid down in the regular Presidency 
Conclusions. However, one has to observe that the specific conditions governing enhanced 
cooperation in the CFSP basically aim at limiting its application and are obviously designed to 
complicate the whole mechanism.  
 
General conditions as laid down in Articles 43-45 TEU 
A further reference contained in Article 27a TEU refers to Article 27c and the provisions 
laid down in Articles 43-45 TEU. In other words, given the clear lack of a specific catalogue of 
conditions governing the establishment of enhanced cooperation in the CFSP (except those 
mentioned above) one has to resort to the general set of premises which are applicable across all 
pillars. It is arguable as to whether to draw a line between objective and subjective criteria.25 
Among the objective criteria are the requirement of a minimum quota amounting to eight Member 
States participating in the mechanism and the principle of openness for all other Member States. 
The condition of being the last resort and the obligation to respect the “competences, rights and 
obligations” of those Member States which do not participate in the enhanced cooperation belong 
to the sphere of subjective criteria. In a similar way to the conditions mentioned above, Article 43 
TEU also enacts the obligation to further the objectives of the Union as a whole, to protect and 
serve their interests and to reinforce the process of integration, as well as to respect the single 
institutional framework and the acquis communautaire. Moreover, according to the Treaty of Nice 
the instrument of enhanced cooperation has to remain within the limits of the powers attributed to 
the Union or to the Community. As soon as the general and specific conditions are met, interested 
Member States are entitled to submit an application for enhanced cooperation to the Council 
(Article 27c TEU). 
 
Conditions laid down in the Constitution 
The grouping of general and specific conditions for enhanced cooperation in Article I-44 
and Articles III-416, 417 and 418 para 1 TCE constitutes a net gain in terms of simplification and 
coherence. As a result, following the bundling of the previously spread provisions and the formal 
overcoming of the pillar-structure, legal requirements for enhanced cooperation are now equally 
applicable for both supranational and intergovernmental policy fields. However, this engenders 
                                                          
25 Zeinhofer (2004) forthcoming. 
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almost no or just slight editorial changes in terms of content and formulation. As an example, one 
might refer to the former requirement to respect the Treaties and the single institutional framework, 
which has been revised accordingly stating that enhanced cooperation will “comply with the 
Union’s Constitution and law”. Furthermore, the original threshold of eight Member States was 
transformed into a minimum share of one-third of all Member States, which, however, will not 
imply substantial changes given the future composition of the EU encompassing 27 Member States. 
 
B. The process of application and authorisation 
 
General Conditions 
When the respective requirements are met, Member States participating in enhanced 
cooperation are authorised to make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the 
European Union in order to pursue the objectives set. The process of application and authorisation, 
however, is subject to specific provisions which vary among the policy areas. 
Accordingly, each application for enhanced cooperation in the field of the European 
Community has to follow the procedure as laid down in Article 11 para 1 TEC, whereas Article 40a 
para 1 TEU governs the respective endeavours in the realm of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Respective requests have to be presented to the Commission, which may in turn submit a 
proposal to the Council. In the event that the Commission refuses to issue a positive proposal, it has 
to forward its reasons to the Member States concerned. Finally, it is up to the Council to formally 
grant authorisation of enhanced cooperation after consulting the European Parliament. 
 
The process in the CFSP 
In the field of CFSP any request aimed at establishing enhanced cooperation has to be 
directly submitted to the Council, which has to forward it to the Commission for its opinion and to 
the European Parliament for its information (Article 27c TEU). Finally, the Council has to decide 
by qualified majority acting in accordance with Article 23 para 2 (2 and 3) TEU. However, the 
apparent exception to the unanimity principle in CFSP matters relates to the simple fact that 
enhanced cooperation is limited to the implementation of a joint action or a common position that is 
already subject to qualified majority. 
 
Scope of discretion of the Council 
In this context, the issue of the Council’s scope for exercising discretion when deciding 
upon the admissibility of enhanced cooperation must be considered. It must also be asked whether 
fulfilling the underlying conditions leads to an automatic legal entitlement for enhanced 
cooperation. According to this approach, the authorisation by the Council would constitute a pure 
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formal act. On the one hand it is arguable as to whether this approach is the most appropriate, given 
the comprehensive catalogue of difficult premises and complex procedural arrangements, which 
would be undermined by an additional discretion attributed to the Council. On the other hand, the 
Council retains the competence to determine whether the subjective criteria are effectively met. To 
put it more concretely, the act of assessing the degree of deepening and enhancing the integration 
process escapes from any viable verification and objective control, thus conferring significant 
discretion to the Council. 
 
Role of the ECJ 
Another problem is indicated by the deliberate lack of competence of the ECJ in the sphere 
of the CFSP. In any event, the existing case law may be applied analogously or at least be consulted 
in order to provide for a homogenous implementation of enhanced cooperation across all pillars. 
However, there is neither a binding obligation towards this end nor a mechanism of supervising it. 
The sole option allowing for ECJ review in the realm of foreign and security policy arises when the 
Court is confronted with possible overlaps of the first and the second or third pillar.26 In the future it 
seems most likely that the ECJ will get more involved in such delimitation problems that directly 
result from an increasing number of such “hybrid acts” covering both matters.27 
 
The veto option 
According to Article 27c TEU referring to Article 23 para 2 (2 and 3) TEU, any Member 
State is entitled to declare its refusal to adopt a given decision by qualified majority voting for 
“important and stated reasons of national policy”. In order to rescue the contentious matter the 
Council may decide to refer the issue to the European Council for decision taking by unanimity. It 
is interesting to observe that despite the formal abolition of this veto clause in all other pillars, it had 
been introduced in the field of enhanced cooperation in the CFSP by the Treaty of Nice.28 
 
The binding effect of the Council’s authorisation 
The authorisation issued by the (European) Council allowing for enhanced cooperation in 
the field of CFSP assumes a binding character on the participating Member States. Moreover, all 
future decisions and acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation are exclusively binding 
                                                          
26 This competence was for the first time confirmed by the Aiport Transit Visa case on the basis of Article 47 TEU; 
Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council, [1998], ECR I-2763. 
27 See Wessel (2000) pp. 1135-1171 (1151). 
28 It is worthwhile to note that a similar mechanism is still effective with regard to the first and the third pillar. However 
the referral to the European Council is just of suspensive effect leaving substantial decisions making to the Council (by 
qualified majority voting).  
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on these states.29 It is important to note that the initial authorisation also constitutes the relevant 
legal basis with regard to forthcoming accessions of other Member States. Therefore, it is not 
allowed to (excessively) deviate from the original scope of action. Member States which do not 
participate in enhanced cooperation are exempted from its binding effects, but they are obliged by 
the Treaty not to impede its implementation (Article 44 para 2 TEU). 
 
Procedure according to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
The legal procedure governing the act of application and authorisation of enhanced 
cooperation, as currently enshrined in the consolidated Treaty of Nice, is also included in the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe. The relevant provisions are enacted in Article III-325 TCE. 
Additional weight is added to the process by the introduction of an extra right to be heard conferred 
upon the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, with regard to the question of consistency.  The 
obligation to consult the European Parliament has been retained unaltered. From a legal perspective, 
one might criticise the insignificant position of the European Parliament, even more since the 
European Parliament has been granted the right of approval in all other policy fields.30  
Decision-making is carried out by European Decisions. These are adopted by unanimity as a 
result of the extension of enhanced cooperation in the CFSP beyond common actions and common 
positions. However, following the provision (“passerelle”) stipulated in Article III-422 TCE the 
Council is entitled to decide by unanimity to later on decide by qualified majority. In a given case, 
this option, which may be used from the start of enhanced cooperation, is then equally applicable to 
the process of authorisation. Different from the original Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe according to which the “passerelle” encompasses all policy fields, decisions having military 
or defence implications are excluded from its application in the current consolidated version 
(Article III-422 para 3 TCE). Nonetheless, in all other fields of external action it is possible to 
enable an avant garde in the framework of enhanced cooperation to proceed by using qualified 
majority voting. In other words, the participating countries would not only advance with regard to 
substantial questions, but would also enjoy extended decision making rights. It goes without saying 
that enhanced cooperation based on qualified majority voting has a rich potential of action at its 
command. 
 
                                                          
29 Article 44 para 2 TEU states: „Such acts and decisions shall be binding only on those Member States which 
participate in such cooperation and, as appropriate, shall be directly applicable only in those States“. 
30 Article III-325 para 1 TCE. 
 
  17
C. The procedure of joining enhanced cooperation at a later stage 
 
The principle of openness 
The legally anchored principle of openness, providing for participation in enhanced 
cooperation either at the initial or at a later stage, applies unconditionally to all the policy fields of 
the European Union.31 In other words, openness has to be guaranteed at any phase of enhanced 
cooperation. However, the requirement to pass a specific process of application and authorisation, 
which is necessary due to a deliberate lack of automatic adherence, challenges the principle of 
openness. Respective modalities on later accession are enacted in Article 27e TEU. 
 
The procedure according to Article 27e TEU 
According to this article, any interested Member State wishing to participate in enhanced 
cooperation has to notify the Council of its intention. It should also inform the Commission which 
is entitled to formulate an opinion to the Council within three month. As for the Council, it has to 
decide on the request within four months of the date of receipt of that notification. Moreover, the 
Council has the discretion, where necessary, to decide upon “specific arrangements” in cases where 
it may deem it necessary. To put it more concretely, despite the principle of openness, participation 
may not be initiated by a unilateral declaration but requires a formal procedure. 
The Council, in its totality, decides on the request of adherence by qualified majority but 
approval is ideally expressed by concealment.32 Any refusal of accession to enhanced cooperation 
has to be qualified as being of temporary nature, since any permanent exclusion from an existing 
enhanced cooperation would be in direct conflict with the Treaty. 
 
The option of “specific arrangements” 
In a further step, the Council has at its disposal the right to decide on “specific 
arrangements” where necessary, for example, in order to facilitate the participation of interested 
Member States. This construction may be compared to the well-known transitional arrangements 
frequently used during the process of accession to the European Union. In turn, the fact that specific 
arrangements of this sort are used in such a way to create more severe criteria, thus rendering 
participation more difficult, is not explicitly excluded. Although the objectives set out in the initial 
decision authorising enhanced cooperation must not be altered or its implementation complicated, 
one may always define conditions which risk undermining the general right of participation. An 
                                                          
31 The guarantee of participation is stated in Article 43b TEU together with Article 27e (second pillar), Article 40b TEU 
(third pillar) and Article 11a TEC (first pillar). 
32 With regard to enhanced cooperation in the first pillar it is the Commission to decide upon any participation at a later 
stage (Article 11a TEC) and in the third pillar it is the Council in the composition of the Council members concerned 
(Article 40b TEU). 
  18
example might be a group of Member States forming an enhanced cooperation (on the basis of a 
common position or common action) which pursue the purpose of dealing with the question of the 
status of Kosovo, in order to represent the EU position on the international stage. If participation at 
a later moment was conditional on significant financial contributions or the deployment of civil 
servants, the basic objectives as set out in the initial decision of the cooperation would not be 
substantially altered. 
 
The Procedure according to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
Similar to the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe provides for 
accession at a later stage, which is explicitly enshrined in Article III-420 para 2 TCE. Compared to 
the current legal system, slight but important differences appear, although they do not contribute to 
the acceleration of the formal procedure. Firstly, the obligation to notify the intention to participate 
in enhanced cooperation has been extended beyond the traditional organs, namely the Council and 
the Commission, to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. In turn, the Commission’s obligation to 
issue a stated opinion has been dropped (but the Commission is free to formulate one). With regard 
to the Council, one may observe an increased number of restrictions compared to its former 
position. In the composition of the Member States concerned, it holds no discretionary decision 
making powers anymore, but has to formally “confirm” the participation of the interested Member 
State, after consulting the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and after “noting” that the pre-set 
conditions have been successfully met. This means, that later participation also requires full and 
explicit approval by the Council, leaving aside the possibility to accept new members by pure 
concealment. Another innovation refers to the option to introduce specific conditions for 
participation in the relevant European Decision founding enhanced cooperation. Against this 
background, Emmanouilidis has noticed a process of “challenging the principle of openness” within 
the framework of the Constitution.33  The author, however, disagrees with this observation, pointing 
at the institutionalised option of “specific arrangements” in the Treaty of Nice, which already 
allows for far-reaching limitations to the principle. In turn, the obligation to define relevant 
conditions at the initial stage of enhanced cooperation and to incorporate them into the founding 
Decision, significantly strengthens predictability and moves further away from the vague style and 
formulation of the current regime in this respect. If the Council comes to the conclusion that the 
required conditions are not met, it has to indicate the arrangements to be adopted and has to set a 
deadline for re-examining the given request. All in all, the procedure under the Constitution reveals 
a much more pro-participatory orientation which is illustrated by the wording of Article III-422 para 
                                                          
33 In the original German version Emmanoulidis speaks of „Konditionalisierung der Offenheit“; Emmanouilidis in 
Giering (2003) p. 68. 
 
  19
2 TCE: “The Council, on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, may also adopt 
any transitional measures necessary with regard to the application of the acts already adopted 
within the framework of enhanced cooperation”. This provision flows from the general obligation 
entrusted to the Commission and the Member States to promote participation by as many Member 
States as possible, and it also ascertains the admissibility of temporary measures in order to support 
acceding Member States.  
 
D. Treaty-based limits 
 
Limitation to common positions and common actions 
Article 27b TEU stipulates that enhanced cooperation in the field of CFSP is strictly limited 
to the implementation of common positions and common action and generally excludes relevant 
cooperation in respect of matters having military or defence implications. Against this background, 
it is hardly comprehensible why common strategies have not been included, above all because they 
are designed to cover areas “where the Member States have important interests in common” (Article 
13 para 2 TEU). Equally excluded are “decisions”, which constitute the fourth legal instrument in 
the realm of CSDP and have to be taken unanimously by the Council. Arguably one may speak of a 
kind of unwritten principle stating that only legal acts that are based on qualified decision-making 
allow for further implementation in the form of enhanced cooperation. In return, one may maintain 
that the given restrictions express no more than the political intention to confine the mechanism of 
enhanced cooperation in the second pillar. During the process of consultation in the European 
Convention, the extension of the scope applicable to enhanced cooperation was one of the most 
controversial questions in the relevant Working Group.34 In the end, one concern of the Franco-
German proposal was pushed through according to which enhanced cooperation should be 
introduced in the field of CSDP without reservation.35 
 
Legal effects 
The Treaty of Nice explicitly states that acts and decisions taken under enhanced 
cooperation do not form part of the Union acquis (Article 44 para 1 TEU). As a consequence, these 
acts and decisions exclusively bind those Member States which participate in such cooperation and 
are directly applicable in those States (Article 44 para 2 TEU). This provision is based on the 
intention to communicate to future Member States that their obligation to take over the whole 
European Union acquis does not encompass measures taken under enhanced cooperation. As a 
                                                          
34 See CONV 791/03, Annex, 2. 
35 See CONV 422/02, nr. 2. 
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result, the question of the legal nature of enhanced cooperation arises. On the one hand, it is 
arguable whether to consider enhanced cooperation to be fully part of the EU acquis. To support 
this argument one may point to the legal basis of enhanced cooperation rooted in primary law and to 
the general entitlement to make use of the Union’s institutions, procedures and mechanisms while 
respecting the institutional framework. This view gains even more momentum by taking into 
consideration that acts of secondary law issued by one of the numerous Association Councils in the 
framework of Association programmes with third States also form part of the EU acquis. The sole 
exceptions refer to the mode of decision making in the Council and to the fact that operative costs 
are to be carried individually by the participating Member States.36 It follows that enhanced 
cooperation in the realm of CFSP has to be qualified as agreement under public international law, 
which constitutes a kind of partial acquis existing among the general or aggregate acquis of the 
Union. The legal obligation to respect the acquis communautaire and to further the objectives of the 
Union indicates that in the event of conflict, the general Union acquis overrides the partial acquis 
created by enhanced cooperation.  
Similarly, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe implies that all acts or decisions 
taken in the framework of enhanced cooperation exclusively bind those Member States participating 
in the mechanism. Furthermore, no candidate country aspiring to accede to the European Union has 
to take over the partial acquis stemming from enhanced cooperation (Article I-44 para 4 TCE). 
 
Parallelism between multiple initiatives of enhanced cooperation or enhanced cooperation 
and specific mechanisms 
A further problem arises with regard to the permissibility of parallel mechanisms of 
enhanced cooperation being identical in terms of objectives and content, or with regard to similar 
initiatives of flexibility based on both, enhanced cooperation and specific mechanisms such as 
structured cooperation. Strikingly, neither the Treaty of Nice nor the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe contains relevant provisions tackling this delicate issue. However, it is not 
simply theoretical fiction to consider the possibility that several Member States, which do not (or do 
not want to) fulfil the criteria allowing for participation in the mechanism of permanent structured 
cooperation could decide to create a parallel mechanism based on enhanced cooperation, but 
promoting more or less the same objectives.  
This problem may only be solved by recourse to the general criteria of enhanced 
cooperation. A first idea is indicated by the obligation to further the objectives of the Union and the 
Community, to serve their interests and to reinforce the integration process. The fragmentation of 
                                                          
36 It is interesting to note, that even in the framework of Union policies in the second and third pillar, operative 
expenditure is charged to the budget of the European Communities, except of measures having military or defence 
implications or if the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise; Article 28 para 3 TEU and Article 41 para 3 TEU.  
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sensitive matters into a set of separate initiatives can be hardly conceived as enhancing the process 
of integration. A similar result can be reached by drawing on the obligation to respect the Treaties 
and the single institutional framework (uniformity clause). Particular consideration has to be paid to 
the principle of consistency with regard to inter-pillar activities within the framework of the CSDP, 
as well as concerning both trans-pillar and external relations of the Union and its institutions. More 
concretely, the principle under consideration stipulates the obligation to work towards highly 
consistent action in terms of internal policy making and in terms of substance. The assumption that 
both objectives are only reachable through conceptual and targeted coordination by the respective 
actors, clearly reveals the disruptive and thus non-consistent potential contained in a situation of 
parallel mechanisms pursuing identical objectives. However, one has to refrain from generalisation. 
The effective danger of undermining consistency by a multitude of flexibility mechanisms always 
has to be assessed and to be proven on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, in the end one should not 
forget the principle of unanimity, which is generally applicable in the second pillar and thus offer a 
last resort to circumvent undesirable parallelism. By contrast it is important to note, that a general 
prohibition of parallel flexibility would confer some kind of exclusive rights to the fastest Member 
States with regard to issues potentially open to enhanced cooperation. Such a situation would be 
prone to provoke uncontrolled competition, which in a worst-case scenario may even favour 
fragmentation within the EU. 
 
V. Specific mechanisms of flexible integration in the CFSP/ESDP 
 
For the first time in the history of the European Union, the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe has introduced a separate section on the European Security and Defence Policy (Article 
I-41 together with Articles III-309 to 312 TCE). To a large extent the provisions contained in this 
section meet the demands already phrased in the final report of the Convention Working Group on 
“Defence”.37 The substantial extension of the concept of security beyond the classical Petersberg 
tasks, figures among the most essential innovations in this context.38 All these tasks are now equally 
designed to contribute to the common objective of fighting against terrorism, which includes the 
readiness to support third countries in combating terrorism within their territories. The 
unconditional acceptance of enhanced cooperation in the field of CFSP and the introduction of new 
forms of flexibility on a legal basis constitute another important leap towards more efficiency and 
operability for the ESDP, as foreseen in numerous Presidency conclusions since Cologne (June 
                                                          
37 See CONV 461/02. Furthermore see the Franco-German contribution to ESDP, CONV 422/02. 
38 According to Article III-309 para 1 TCE these tasks encompass (by using civilian and military means) joint 
disarmament operation, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and 
peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilisation. 
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1999) and Helsinki (December 1999). However, these measures are of an inherent alternative 
nature, resulting from the unresolved antagonism between the demand for efficiency and the 
principle of unanimity within the framework of CFSP/CSDP. As long as the Member States prevent 
substantial transfer of sovereign rights in the field of external and security policy to the European 
level, any successful implementation of activities in this field will inevitably rely upon progressive 
groups of a few. Their effective ability to tackle sensitive issues on the European level but in an 
asymmetric structure solely depends, on the one hand, on the political will and on the other hand, on 
the financial and operational capacity.  
During the Intergovernmental Conference a number of provisions contained in the Draft 
Constitution underwent fundamental discussions and substantial amendments. In order to follow 
this process in a chronological order, particular attention has to be paid to the so-called “Naples-
Document” dating 25 November 200339 and the subsequent papers of 2 December, 5 December and 
9 December 2003.40 Any additional document which refered to the legal framework of the CFSP 
did not alter the trade-offs consented to beforehand.41 These compromises reflected a high degree of 
mutual agreement among the Member States. As expected, they have been incorporated into the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The following analysis will be effected on the basis 
of the legal framework offered by the current version of the Constitution. Only in exceptional cases 
will references be made to the Draft Constitution or to respective documents issued during the IGC. 
 
A. Implementation of missions by a group of Member States 
 
This form of flexibility refers to the situation in which the Council entrusts the 
implementation of a civilian or military task, as foreseen in the Constitution, to a group of Member 
States “which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task” (Article III-310 para 1 
TCE). To this end, the Council has to adopt a European decision by unanimity. According to Article 
III-310 para 2 TCE, the European decision has to contain detailed information on the objectives and 
scope and the general conditions for the implementation of the mission. The Member States 
involved, in association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree collectively on the 
concrete management of the task. Despite the considerable extent of autonomy conferred on the 
participating Member States, they are obliged to regularly inform the Council of the progress 
achieved during the operation, either on their own initiative or at the request of a non-participating 
Member State. The mandatory liability towards the Council is most visible in the event that the 
                                                          
39 See CIG 52/03 ADD 1 (Annex 17: CSDP). 
40 See CIG 57/03 (Defence); CIG 57/1/03 (Defence), CIG 60/03, ADD 1 (Annex 22: ESDP). 
41 See CIG 73/04 (Annex 24: ESDP); CIG 76/04 (Annex 20: ESDP), CIG 80/04 (Annex 4: CSFP), CIG 81/04 (Annex 
28, 29, 30 CFSP/CSDP). 
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completion of the task has major consequences or requires amendments of the objective, scope and 
conditions. In such cases, the Council is entitled to authorise necessary adaptations to the legal basis 
of the operation by means of a European decision. 
One of the advantages attributable to this mechanism consists of the lack of any obligatory 
minimum number of participants for the benefit of rapid coalition building of the “able and the 
willing”. In other words, only two Member States would be sufficient to form such a group in order 
to implement a European mission. In return, all Member States which do not contribute to the group 
are bound to refrain from any opposing action. 
All other necessary decisions for the day-to-day business of the operation are exclusively 
decided on by the participating countries. Given the lack of any specification, it is arguable whether 
it is best that these kinds of decisions have to be taken by unanimity. Moreover, the Constitution is 
not clear on the effective scope of group-specific decision-making rights. Do they encompass even 
the most important issues such as the Operation Plan (OPLAN) or the Rules of Engagement, 
generally taken in the framework of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) or are they taken 
by all EU Members. However, since the European Union is the contracting partner offering support 
by means of a crisis-management mission to a third country, it is most unlikely that it will forgo its 
decision-making rights with regard to the most sensitive rules governing a civil or military 
operation.  Moreover, the Constitution remains silent on the question of participation rights for third 
countries willing to contribute to a European mission. The same is true for Member States that wish 
to join the group at a later stage. Given the apparent lack of explicit rules one may, in an analogous 
manner, draw conclusions from the law on enhanced cooperation, at least to a certain extent. In 
other words, it is disputable whether the principle of openness equally applies to the specific forms 
of flexible integration and that in practice it is sufficient to notify the intention to participate to the 
Council and the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs. In return, the final decision will be taken by the 
Council in its entirety. Different from the concept of enhanced cooperation, the type of flexible 
integration discussed is designed to implement a EU initiative (namely to conduct a crisis-
management operation). Thus the decision-making rights with regard to the establishment and 
further development of such a group is a Union competence (whereas in the realm of enhanced 
cooperation this right is conferred solely upon the participating countries). It should be pointed out 
that the only criteria required for participation is to be “willing” and to possess “the necessary 
capability”. Accordingly, any interested Member State fulfilling these criteria will be entitled to 
join the group. 
Another question points at the financial aspect. To put it more concretely, what kind of 
financial resources are foreseen to cover the costs entailed by the execution of operations 
implemented by only a group of Member States? In short, the general financial provisions 
applicable on external action become effective. This means any administrative costs are charged to 
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the Union budget (article III-313 para 1 TCE). The same is true for operational expenditure with 
regard to purely civilian missions. In a case of an operation having military or defence implications, 
the operational expenditure is charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national 
product scale, unless the Council decides otherwise. The question arises as to whether these costs 
are to be incurred exclusively by the participating countries, or whether the financial burden will be 
borne by all Member States? In this respect the framework decision on the financing of operations 
having military or defence implications adopted by the European Council in June 2002 may shed 
some additional light.42 According to it, operational costs are subdivided into three categories: 
firstly, common costs that cannot be allotted to individual States taking part43; secondly, costs for 
the transportation and the accommodation of the forces and the barracks which may be established 
collectively depending on the Council, which decides on a case-by-case basis; thirdly, all other 
costs which are considered individual costs. However it is explicitly stated that common financing 
of incremental costs for ESDP operations “does not entail financing of military assets and 
capabilities offered by participant States on a voluntary basis”44. To the author it seems most likely 
that expenditure arising from the above-mentioned deployment, as well as from so-called 
“individual costs” that have to be financed on a “costs lie where they fall” basis, will be exclusively 
charged to the contributing countries. Despite the fact that all Member States have to decide 
unanimously on an EU-operation, they may not be likewise “able” or “willing” to effectively 
deploy troops and assets. In return, it would be justified if the so-called “common costs” were borne 
through a repartition by all Member States, since they all have approved its execution. However, the 
Constitution does not clarify this point, which most probably will be left to practice. 
In addition one may enquire about any alternatives, namely whether for the implementation of 
(extended) Petersberg tasks one may also resort to enhanced cooperation? The Constitution itself 
does not indicate anything contrary to this assumption, since it does not establish a kind of 
hierarchical order between measures of enhanced cooperation and the specific modes of flexibility. 
However, bearing in mind the comprehensive catalogue of criteria which have to be met in order to 
launch enhanced cooperation, the attraction of enhanced cooperation in this field will be relatively 
reduced. 
 
                                                          
42 EU-Doc. 10155/02 of 18.06.2002. 
43 These costs encompass incremental costs for the headquarters for EU-led operation  (transport costs, administration, 
locally hired personnel, communications, transportation/travel within the operations area of headquarter, barracks and 
lodging/infrastructure, public information, representation and hospitality) as well as incremental costs incurred for 
providing support to the forces as a whole (infrastructure, additional equipment, identification marking, medical). 
44 EU-Doc. 10155/02 of 18.06.2002, para. 2.2. 
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B. Permanent structured cooperation 
 
The possibility to enter into a permanent structured cooperation as defined in Article I-41 
para 6 TCE is open to those Member States “whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most 
demanding missions”. Both the criteria and the necessary operational commitments to be made are 
listed in a separate protocol added to the Constitution. This is a significant improvement compared 
to the Draft Treaty issued by the Convention, which had left the definition of the criteria and the 
specification of the commitments up to the Member States. As a result of legistic shortcomings and 
ambiguous terms, such as “higher criteria”, but even more because of the common demand by the 
Member States to establish structured cooperation as an inclusive and predictable institution, this 
led to revision of the relevant provisions during the IGC.  
Among the most essential conditions figure the obligation to intensively develop the 
national defence capacities “through the development of its national contributions and 
participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment 
programmes and in the activity of the Defence Agency”45. Moreover, the participating Member 
States should have the capacity to supply targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured 
at a tactical level as a battle group, and capable of carrying out the extended Petersberg-Missions 
within a period of 5 to 30 days, which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be 
extended up to at least 120 days, by 2007 at the latest. These combat units are particularly - 
however not exclusively - designed to carry out operations in response to requests from the United 
Nations. Article 2 of the Protocol contains a list of detailed requirements, which the participating 
States have to meet in order to reach the common objectives. Among them figure measures to 
enhance the availability, inter-operability, flexibility and deployability of the forces and to bring the 
defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible by harmonising, pooling and even 
specialising the Member State’s defence means and capabilities. To a certain extent, these measures 
meet the frequent demands to introduce military convergence criteria in order to close the operative 
gap.46 However, the catalogue on structured cooperation does not tackle the core concern, namely 
the determination of a financial threshold based on national GNP to be dedicated for defence 
matters. 
The mechanism of structured cooperation is open to all Member States provided they do 
meet the relevant criteria set out in the protocol. It is sufficient to notify the intention to the Council 
and to the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the Council has to adopt, within a time 
span of three month, a European decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and 
                                                          
45 23. Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation, Article 1a. 
46 Missiroli (1999) 485. 
  26
determining the list of participating Member States. To this end, the Council acts by qualified 
majority voting after having consulted the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (Article III-312 para 
2 TCE). Any request to accede to permanent structured cooperation at a later stage has to follow the 
same procedure, except the fact that effective participation in the Council vote is limited to these 
members representing the participating States (Article III-312 para 3 TCE). 
The rigorous conditionality between participation and the fulfilment of the pre-defined 
criteria consequently includes the option to suspend Member States which no longer fulfil the 
criteria or are no longer able to meet the commitments. The respective European decision taken by 
the Council composed of the participating countries (except of the Member State concerned) has to 
be based on consolidated findings by the defence agency. A qualified majority will be defined by at 
least 55% of the members of the Council representing the participating Member States, comprising 
at least 65% of the population of these States. 
All other decisions taken in the framework of permanent structured cooperation are to be 
adopted by unanimity by the Council, composed of representatives of the participating countries 
only (Article III-312 para 6 TCE). In order to prevent the establishment of exclusive clubs, all 
Member States are entitled to participate in the consultation process. 
The original intention as laid down in the Draft Constitution was to normatively link 
structured cooperation with the instrument of enhanced cooperation. According to the former 
Article III-213 para 5 D-TCE that “ [n]otwithstanding the previous paragraphs, the appropriate 
provisions relating to enhanced cooperation [ex-Articles III-325 (2) and III-326 (2)] shall apply to 
the structured cooperation governed by this Article”. This provision was misleading since the 
Articles in question mainly refer to the process of establishing or joining enhanced cooperation, 
which has already been regulated in detail by Article III-213 D-TCE. Consequently, the reference to 
enhanced cooperation has been dropped during the IGC. 
Moreover, in the framework of the IGC negotiation process the explicit reference was 
dropped according to which the members of structured cooperation are empowered to carry out 
crisis management operations. However, one may deduce the general permissibility of such 
activities from the fact that permanent structured cooperation will not affect the provisions of 
Article III-309 TCE. Furthermore, a closer look at the objectives as enacted in the Protocol on 
permanent structured cooperation may shed some additional light on the role of its members in 
international crisis management operations. Accordingly they will “have the capacity to supply by 
2007 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted 
combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support 
elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 
III-309, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United 
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Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended 
up to at least 120 days.”47 
However, Article III-312 does not constitute a particular legal basis for the execution of 
military operations. By contrast, this quality is exclusively limited to Articles III-309 and III-310 
TCE. In other words, Article III-312 constitutes the legal foundation for substantial cooperation in 
order to meet the agreed objectives, while it does not work as a basis for launching operations in a 
concrete crisis situation. 
 
Thus, the Constitution actually encompasses two instead of three provisions as foreseen in 
the Draft Constitution, enabling either all Member States (Article III-309 para 2 TCE) or groups of 
them (Article III-310 para 1 TCE) to carry out civil or military crisis operations. It has to be noted 
that generally all Member States are invited to contribute military troops and civil personnel but it 
would be over-optimistic to expect collective action based on unanimous decision-making by 25 
Member States. Most likely is a scenario according to which civil or low-risk operations will be 
executed by ad-hoc groups according to Article III-310 para 1 TCE, while high-risk operations will 
be carried out by members of permanent structured cooperation equally based on Article III-310 
para 1 TCE. 
  
C. Participation within the Agency in the fields of defence capabilities development, 
research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) 
 
In addition to the obligation of the Member States “”to undertake to progressively improve 
their military capabilities” the Constitution foresees the establishment of an Agency in the fields of 
defence capabilities development, research acquisition and armaments  
“to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those 
requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, 
implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and 
technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European 
capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the 
improvement of military capabilities”.48 
A more detailed catalogue of its functions is contained in Article III-311 para 1 TCE. 
Effective participation in the agency remains facultative and does not affect membership in other 
forms of flexible integration in the field of armament cooperation. In this respect the final report of 
                                                          
47 Protocol nr. 23 on Permanent Structured Cooperation, Article 1b. 
48 See Article I-41 para 3 TCE. 
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the Convention working group on “Defence” suggested,49 that the agency should “incorporate, with 
a European label, closer forms of cooperation which already exist in the armaments field between 
certain Member States (OCCAR, LoI). The Agency should also be tasked with strengthening the 
industrial and technological base of the defence sector. It should also incorporate the appropriate 
elements of the cooperation that most Member States undertake within the WEAG.”50 
The incorporation of existing initiatives in the field of armaments into the context of EU 
policies, accentuates the need for modalities allowing for the participation of third States and the 
willingness of the Member States to substitute national regulatory frameworks and preferential 
economic relations by a common approach in this field. This is particularly true given the fact that 
only a small number have significant industrial defence sectors. In other words, most Member 
States are consumers rather than producers of defence equipment. However, most details on the 
participation, the role of the Commission or on procedural aspects regarding the incorporation of 
OCCAR, WEAG/WEAO and LoI are not exhaustively dealt with in the Constitution. 
By contrast, the objectives of the agency are well defined, encompassing the fields of 
procurement, research and the establishment of a common defence market. However, the exclusion 
in primary law of the application of competition rules in the defence sector is in direct opposition to 
the envisaged profile of the European Defence Agency.51 The unconditional transfer of Article 296 
TCE into the framework of the Constitution (Article III-436 TCE) despite prominent voices 
opposing it, may raise concerns on the seriousness of the Agency project. In addition, due to the 
voluntary nature of participation in the Agency, any full application of the competition rules on the 
defence sector would not be acceptable. It would be more realistic to adapt the relevant provision 
accordingly or to agree on a general waiver with regard to the use of Article 296 TEC in order to 
boost the European defence market.52  
 
The establishment of a European Armament Agency was originally intended to become part 
of the new Constitution that will hopefully enter into force in 2007 or 2008. This schedule became 
confused when the European Council of Thessaloniki in June 2003 endorsed the idea of a Defence 
Agency and explicitly tasked the “appropriate bodies of the Council to undertake the necessary 
actions towards creating, in the course of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence 
capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments.”53 In the following, the Council 
decided to appoint an ‘Agency Establishment Team’ (AET) in order to prepare the institutional 
                                                          
49 See CONV 451/02, para 64. 
50 WEAG – group for armaments cooperation between 19 European countries (14 of which are members of the 
European Union and 16 members of NATO), the objective being harmonisation of operational programmes and 
standards, cooperation on research and technology and the opening up of contracts. 
51 See Article 296 para 1 TEC. 
52 See Communication of the European Commission ‚Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy‘, COM(2003) 113, 
11.03.2003. 
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setting.54 Subsequently this led to the establishment of the European Defence Agency under a Joint 
Action of the EU on 12 July 2004.55 
This raises two questions: the first regards a legal problem. Due to the preparation and 
setting up of the Defence Agency far ahead of the coming into force of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, it is likely to significantly pre-determine its substance. Secondly, the 
intended incorporation of the above-mentioned cooperation programmes into the Agency (to which 
participation is purely voluntary) and the option to set up exclusive industrial arrangements finds 
itself in direct opposition to the Nice Treaty provisions excluding enhanced cooperation from issues 
having military or defence implications. Nonetheless must be emphasised that the Agency is not 
based on enhanced cooperation but on a Joint Action, decided by all Member States.  
The new Defence Agency absorbs the provisions contained in Article III-311 TCE as 
regards content and objectives, while respecting the national security and defence competences of 
participating Member States. The Agency, which has legal personality, will be subject to the 
Council’s authority. The Council is entitled to issue guidelines annually, determining the priorities 
of the Agency’s work programme. The Agency is headed by the SG/HR for the CFSP who equally 
chairs the Steering Board composed of one representative of each participating country. The 
steering board is likely to meet at least twice a year at the level of Defence Ministers. The actual 
conception of the Agency clearly builds on intergovernmental concerns. However, with regard to 
efficiency a more independent construction certainly would have been preferable.  
The necessary revenue to cover expenditure will to a large extent come from contributions 
by the Member States participating in the Agency, based on the gross national income scale. In 
other words, except specifically ear-marked revenue granted on a case-by-case basis for specific 
purposes, the Agency will receive no financial contributions from the general budget of the 
European Union.56 However, in addition the Agency will also carry out ad-hoc projects or 
programmes which will be funded by associated budgets that may even be completed by 
Community contributions. Among them one may differentiate between projects/programmes in 
which all participating Member States are presumed to participate (Category A) and those which 
may implemented by a reduced group  (Category B). Participating Member States involved in the 
latter category are solely bound to make financial contributions. Thus flexibility within flexibility 
was introduced into the realm of European Union law. Another meaningful aspect is the option to 
include third parties contributions to a particular ad-hoc project or programme on the approval of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
53 European Council of Thessaloniki, 19-20 June 2003, Presidency Conclusions, para 65. 
54 Council Decision of 17.11.2003 creating a team to prepare for the establishment of the agency in the field of defence 
capabilities, development, research, acquisition and armament, OJ L 318, 03.12.2003, 19. 
55 Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, OJ L 245, 17.07.2004, 
17. 
56 Article 15 of the Joint Action. 
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the Steering Board. The question of third party contribution was raised for the first time in the 
framework of the Joint Action, thus shedding light on an important aspect of the future functioning 
of the Agency (Article 23 of the Joint Action). 
Moreover the Agency is intended to “develop close working relations with the relevant elements of 
OCCAR, the LoI Framework Agreement, and WEAG/WEAO with a view to incorporate those 
elements or assimilate their principles and practices in due course, as appropriate and by mutual 
agreement” (Article 25 para 2 of the Joint Action). Particular concern is paid to the non-EU WEAG 
members which will enjoy the fullest possible transparency with regard to the Agency’s specific 
projects in order to attract their participation when appropriate. A specific consultative committee 
will be set up to guarantee regular exchange of views and information on relevant matters of mutual 
interest. It follows that in the initial phase the Agency will work as a sort of coordination forum 
while the effective employment of its full range of operational functions is to be expected only after 
the incorporation of the above-mentioned cooperation programmes.  
However, with regard to the future entering into force of the Constitution two questions 
arise: firstly, does the now established agency fully correspond with the Defence Agency foreseen 
in the Constitution? Secondly, does the entering into force of the Constitution require another 
European decision according to Article III-311 para 2 TCE in order to (re-)establish the Agency 
under the Constitution? With regard to the first question, the similarity of both concepts may 
necessarily be assumed to a great extent. Examining the scope of functions attributed to both 
agencies reveals them to be identical, although the shape and key functions of the now existent 
agency are outlined in a more detailed manner. As to the second question, it is important to refer to 
the provisions on succession and legal continuity enacted in Article III-438 TCE. According to 
paragraph 3, all acts adopted on the basis of the former treaties, then repealed by the Constitution, 
will remain in force. Moreover, their legal effects will be preserved until those acts are repealed, 
annulled or amended in the implementation of the Constitution. In other words, the Joint Action 
establishing the European Defence Agency, which is clearly based on Article 14 of the TEU, will 
remain in force until it is altered in the way outlined above. Thus, the Council will be entitled to re-
establish the Agency by a separate European Decision and even change its mandate as long as it 
respects the Constitution. The shift of the constitutional regime does not run counter the 
preservation of the original legal basis whose legal continuity is ensured by Constitutional law. 
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D. Excursus 1: Closer cooperation 
 
Closer cooperation as originally anchored in Article I-40 para 7 together with Article III-214 
of the Draft Treaty, referred to the field of “mutual defence”. This mechanism was not designed to 
substitute a collective defence clause but to constitute an interim option, as long as the Council has 
not (unanimously) decided on introducing common defence according to Article I-41 para 2 TCE. 
The terminological choice of “mutual defence” will simply indicate that it does not yet refer to a 
fully-fledged “collective defence”. 
This mechanism did provide that any participating Member State which is the “victim of an 
armed aggression on its territory” may, after having informed the others, “request aid and 
assistance from them”.57 In such a situation the Member States were bound, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter58 to “give it aid and assistance by all means in their power, 
military or other”.59 The text was nearly identical to the provision of Article V WEU-Treaty 
encompassing the collective defence clause to which the members of the Western European Union 
are subject. It may be understood as an attempt to establish at least a partial defence union since any 
initiative to introduce a common defence regime within the Union had failed so far. In practice, all 
participating Member States would have had to be listed in a declaration (not a protocol) annexed to 
the Constitution. 
This legal construction, however, met considerable resistance during the IGC finally leading 
to its transformation into a common but substantially limited collective defence clause (Article I-41 
para 7 TCE). In addition, the provisions stipulated in Article III-214 D-TCE have been deleted in 
their entirety. In addition, the scope of addressees has been extended to all Member States of the 
EU, which will be collectively obliged (arg. “shall have the obligation”) in accordance with Article 
51 of the UN Charter, to give their aid and support to any Member State which had fallen victim to 
an armed attack against its territory. It is interesting to note that according to the previous version 
the Member States would not be “requested” any more. However, the Member States dropped the 
explicit requirement in the Constitution that the aid and assistance have to be “military or other”. 
This indicates that closer cooperation does not mean a purely military collective defence clause, 
whereas the reference to the legitimate right of individual and collective self-defence as provided by 
the UN Charter does indicate its permissibility. Moreover, from the perspective of EU law, two 
significant restrictions have to be taken into consideration: 
                                                          
57 Article III-214 para 2 D-TCE. 
58 Article 51 of the UN Charter states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
59 Article I-41 para 7 TCE. 
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First of all, the stated clause does not affect the “specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States” (Article I-41 para 7 TCE). In other words, by introducing 
this somewhat awkward condition it was intended to take into consideration the status of the neutral 
and non-aligned Member States, namely Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland. The foreign 
ministers of these countries have signed a collective petition note addressed to the Council, openly 
opposing provisions containing formally binding security guarantees since they would be in conflict 
with their national security policy or with constitutional requirements.60 However, despite the fact 
that these concerns have been partly met, it does not mean that Austria is generally absolved from 
giving any aid and assistance. Austria is solely released from that charge as relevant action falls 
under remit of its neutrality. It has to be clarified that Austria’s obligations stemming from the 
Constitutional Act on Neutrality have been widely derogated from, not only following Austria’s 
active participation in sanctions governed by a mandate of the UN Security Council, but even more 
because of its constitutional commitment to actively and unconditionally contribute to the CFSP.61 
The legally binding remains of the Austrian concept of permanent neutrality may be summarised as 
the prohibition to join military alliances or to accept deployment of foreign troops on the national 
territory, as well as the constitutionally anchored ban on direct or indirect support of belligerent 
parties (e.g. supply of goods, loans etc.) which are not members of the EU. In the light of the 
foreseen EU collective defence clause, Austria is not bound to actively contribute to measures of 
collective military self-defence. However, Austria may be (politically) obliged to give effective 
humanitarian assistance to EU-Members which have become victims of an armed aggression. 
The second restriction enacted in Article I-41 para 7 TCE states, that “[c]ommitments and 
cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States 
which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementations”. Therewith an answer was given to the question of primacy between the two 
organisations in case of an attack against a EU+NATO member, cementing the prior role of the 
Atlantic alliance towards its own members. Moreover, the solution found corresponds to the basic 
principle of the ESDP, according to which the Union will only become active when the Alliance as 
a whole is not engaged. 
Another question that is still not resolved concerns the possibility of extending the scope of 
application of the bilateral Berlin-plus agreement to cases of armed aggression against the territory 
of EU Member States. Berlin-plus contains guarantees of “assured access” to NATO planning 
capabilities and of “presumed access” to other capabilities and assets. However, these guarantees 
                                                          
60 See CIG 62/03 (Letter from E. Tuomioja, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland; B. Cowen, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Ireland, B. Ferrero-Waldner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria and L. Freivalds, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Sweden). 
61 See Article 23f para 1 of the Austrian Constitution (B-VG). 
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have been reserved for EU-led operations carrying out Petersberg-tasks as laid down in Article 17 
para 2 TEU, in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. The applicability of the agreement on 
measures of military self-defence is more than questionable, however, it will hardly gain practical 
relevance. Above all, because any attack against an EU-Member would most likely be against a 
NATO-Member too, it would thus automatically engender the principle of NATO-primacy. For the 
sake of completeness it has to be noted that in a specific declaration of the European Council it was 
agreed that EU-Member States which are neither Members of NATO nor of the NATO Partnership 
for Peace programme (PfP) would not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO 
assets.62 In actual fact, this restriction exclusively applies to  Cyprus and Malta. 
Following the assumption that measures of flexibility may not only allow for making  use of 
the institutional setting of the Union but equally authorises the drawing upon the Union acquis, 
including international agreements, one could be inclined to accept automatic rights of recourse to 
NATO assets in the field of closer cooperation. Inversely, if one applies the relevant legal provision 
within the framework of enhanced cooperation which states, that participating Member States “may 
make use it Institutions and exercise those competences by applying the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution” (Article I-44 para 1 TCE) it would be difficult to establish legitimate grounds 
allowing for automatic recourse to further more substantial rights. Moreover, the role of NATO as 
the foundation of collective defence to its members may not be undermined by extensive 
interpretation of its restrictively assured guarantees. 
 
Compared to the original concept of closer cooperation according to which it should be 
established by unilateral declaration signed by the interested Member States (which are then 
compiled in a list annexed to the Constitution), the current conceptualisation is designed to have 
general effect from the beginning. To put it more concretely, all Member States are bound by it, 
except those that are exempted from collective defence due to their specific status of neutrality or 
non-alignment. Against this background, one has to note the transformation of the former concept 
of flexibility as stipulated by the Draft Treaty into a provision now generally applicable within the 
framework of the CFSP. 
Due to the abolition of the construction of closer cooperation, the current clause, as 
stipulated in Article I-41 para 7 TCE, has to be qualified as a restricted collective defence clause 
which does apply to all Member States without specific implementation or accession. Compared to 
the instrument of structured cooperation, there are neither pre-defined criteria nor does the Council 
dispose of any discretionary authority regarding participation. It is sufficient to be an EU Member 
State in order to enjoy rights and obligation from it. It follows that for the time being third States 
may not join in.  
                                                          
62 European Council Copenhagen, 12-13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, Bull.EU 12-2002, nr. I.17.  
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E. Excursus 2: Protocol nr. 24 on Article I-41 para 2 TCE 
 
When looking more closely at the Protocol nr. 24, which is annexed to the Constitution, it 
reveals an interesting legal aspect with regard to flexibility. In the protocol it is stated that “the 
Union shall draw up, together with the Western European Union, arrangements for enhanced 
cooperation between them”. This inevitably leads to the question of whether the required sort of 
cooperation corresponds to the mechanism of enhanced cooperation in the sense of Article I-44 
TCE or whether it hints at informal endeavours towards cementing relations between the two 
organisations. 
Against this background it is worthwhile to consider two important features: 
First of all, the purpose of the WEU is reduced to the collective defence clause enacted in 
Article V of the WEU-Treaty. The dynamic development of the St-Malo process and the related set-
up of military structures within the framework of ESDP led to substantive erosion of the WEU’s 
initial functions. According to the Presidency conclusions issued at the conference of the European 
Council in Cologne in June 1999, it was plainly anticipated that the WEU would have “fulfilled its 
purpose” as an organisation by the end of 2000.63 This would not entail its total liquidation as an 
international organisation but at the same time however, the sole existence of the collective defence 
clause in Article V and of the WEU-Assembly according to Article IX WEU-Treaty64 simply 
reduced the WEU to a contractual carcass. After the transfer of the operational functions and 
capabilities from the WEU into the EU, all references to the WEU were dropped in the Treaty of 
Nice. By contrast, the partial dissolution of the WEU did not affect the status of membership and 
did not annul the existing acts of secondary law governing relations between both of them.65 
Secondly, one has to take note of an important Council decision dating 9 May 1999 
concerning the arrangements for enhanced cooperation between the WEU and the EU with a view 
to fully integrating the WEU into the EU.66 The decision drew upon the Protocol on Article 17 
Treaty of Amsterdam which had stipulated that “the EU shall draw up, together with the WEU, 
arrangement for enhanced cooperation between them within a year from the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam”. The document encapsulates a comprehensive list of regulations governing 
the following aspects: 
- Improvement of the coordination, consultation and decision-making notably in crisis 
situations; 
                                                          
63 European Council Cologne of 3-4 June 1999, Presidency Conclusions, annex 3, in: Bull.EU 6-1999, nr. I.58.5. 
64 In the last declaration issued by the WEU Council on 17.11.2000 it is stated: “Ministers approved the WEU residual 
functions and structures which (...) will enable the Member States to fulfil the commitments of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, particularly those arising from Article V and IX, to which the Member States reaffirm their attachment”; Europe 
Documents, nr. 2219, 18.11.2000, pp. 1-4. 
65 Hummer/Obwexer (2001) 43. 
66 Council Decision of 10.05.1999, OJ L 153, 19.06.1999, 1. 
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- Regular contacts between the staff of both organisations; 
- Harmonisation, as far as possible, of the sequence of the WEU and EU Presidencies and 
their rules of administration; 
- Regulation allowing for the relevant bodies of the EU, including its Policy Planning and 
Early Warning Unit, to draw on the resources of the WEU’s Military Staff, Satellite Centre 
and Institute of Security Studies; 
- Cooperation in the field of armaments with a view to more effective cooperation, 
coordination and rationalisation and the establishment of a European Armaments Agency. 
- Cooperation with the Commission; 
- Regulations on secrecy. 
These issues have been further elaborated on in a comprehensive compendium of six 
annexes. An annexed flowchart provides additional guidance on the decision-making process for 
cases where the EU avails itself of the WEU according to Article 17 para 2 and 3 Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
Thus, any legal assessment of the requirement to establish arrangements for enhanced 
cooperation as enacted in Protocol nr. 24 of the Constitution, has to be aligned with the objectives 
as set out in the Council decision in 1999. In other words, enhanced cooperation in the sense of the 
Protocol indicates institutionalised cooperation between the two organisations, but does not mean 
employing the technical instrument as stipulated in Article I-44 TCE. Another option could be that 
the ten full members of the WEU establish enhanced cooperation among them with a view to taking 
over the residual functions of the WEU, namely to anchor the collective defence clause in the 
framework of the Union. Certainly, non-WEU members, such as the new EU Member States which 
enjoyed the status of Associated Members to the WEU, would have the right to join in at a later 
stage. This argument however, is somewhat inconsistent when confronted with Article I-41 para 7 
TCE according to which all Member States are obliged to give aid and assistance in case of a 
military attack against the territory of another Member. The exceptions granted to the neutrals and 
non-aligned countries exclusively regards States which have never been full members to the 
WEU.67 
It is uncertain whether other forms of cooperation may be effectively installed between the 
WEU and the EU, taking into consideration that the WEU Council has not been convened since 
November 2000. Thus one may even presume that the incorporation of Protocol 24 into the 
Constitution was nothing more than an accidental act. 
 
                                                          
67 Austria, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Ireland have a status as “Observers” at the WEU. Czech Republic, Norway, 
Poland, Hungary, Iceland and Turkey are “Associate Members” because of the their NATO-membership. Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Slovakia, the Baltic States and Slovenia are “Associate Partners”.  
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VI. Flexible integration outside the Treaties 
 
A. WEAG/WEAO, OCCAR, Letter of Intent (LoI) 
 
Three fora tackling armament and procurement policy figure among the most important 
cooperation mechanisms in the realm of foreign and security policy, but outside the European 
Treaty framework. These are the WEAG/WEAO, OCCAR and the members of the framework 
agreement LoI.68 
 
The WEAG followed the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) which was founded 
in 1976 by European NATO-members (with the exception of Ireland). In December 1992, the IEPG 
defence ministers decided to transfer the functions of IEPG to the WEU, where the WEAG is 
intended to coordinate programmes and cooperations in the field of armament among 19 equal 
European States. This includes the endeavour to harmonise programmes and operative standards, to 
strengthen technological and research cooperation and the liberalisation of relevant markets. 
Subsequent to the introduction of the CFSP into the Treaty of Maastricht, the WEAG tasked an ad 
hoc study group to review the possibilities of creating an European Armaments Agency. However, 
this attempt failed because of a lack of political, legal and economic support. Nevertheless, by 
drawing on the preliminary studies it was possible in 1997 to create the WEAO as a formal 
subsidiary body of WEU. WEAO and WEAG are still assigned to the organisational sphere of the 
WEU, despite the massive decomposition of the WEU. The WEAO mainly focuses on defence 
research and technology activities, but as the potential precursor for the proposed agency the 
relevant Article 7 of the WEAO Charter provides for a broad mandate of possible activities.69  
 
OCCAR was created on 12 November 1996 by France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom.70 It aims at improving efficiency in the management of collaborative defence equipment 
programmes. Among the most important programmes are “Tiger” (combat helicopter), “Boxer” 
(armoured utility vehicles) and “A400” (airlift). The latter one is important since it includes third 
States for the first time namely Spain, Turkey, Belgium and Luxembourg.  
 
 
                                                          
68 WEAG/WEAO (Western European Armament Group/Western European Armament Organisation), OCCAR 
(Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armament), LoI (Letter of Intent). 
69 Article 7 of the WEAO-Charter states: “In order to carry out the aim defined in Article 6 above (...) the WEAO may 
undertake, in the name of the WEU and on behalf of one or more participants, the following functions: a) defence 
research and technology activities; b) procurement of defence equipment; c) studies; d) management of assets and 
facilities; e) other functions necessary to carry out the aim of the organisation”. 
70 The OCCAR Convention was signed on 9 September 1998, ratification of the Convention was completed in 
December  2000 and OCCAR attained legal status on 28 January 2001. 
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According to Article 8 of the Convention, OCCAR’s mandate encompasses a comprehensive range 
of activities which makes it eligible to become a fully-fledged armaments agency.71 
LoI is based on a common initiative by the six leading European armament producing 
countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden) signed on 6 July 1998 pursuing the 
objective to harmonise existing regulations in this field. They set up a number of working groups 
which mainly focused on issues of cross-border restructuring and aspects of security in the realm of 
armament supply and information. A comprehensive report was produced on the basis of their 
findings which will, after ratification by the national parliaments, become an international treaty.72 
The incorporation of these mechanisms must be given highest priority in order to fully 
exploit the potential synergies which eventually may lead to a common policy in this field. 
 
B. Close bilateral cooperation between the Member States or in the framework of NATO 
or WEU 
 
According to Article 17 para 4 TEU “[t]he provisions of this Article shall not prevent the 
development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the 
framework of the Western European Union (WEU)and NATO”  provided such cooperation does not 
run counter to or impede the implementation of the CFSP. This kind of cooperation does not depend 
upon prior approval by the Council nor of the fulfilment of specific criteria as developed with 
regard to enhanced cooperation. The most important examples of such cooperation are the 
WEAG/WEAO, OCCAR and the LoI. It is important to note that this clause has not been inserted 
into the Constitution, which however, must not be interpreted as a contrarius actus. 
In addition there exists a variety of multinational forces. Best know of them is, of course, the 
Eurokorps which was created in 1992 on the basis of a Franco-German initiative. Meanwhile it 
draws it components from five countries (Germany, France, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg) and 
is frequently referred to as the nucleus of a future European army.73 Based on a similar 
conceptualisation are the land and see forces EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR which were created 
in 1995 by France, Spain and Italy. Another concrete example stems from the German-Dutch 
                                                          
71 Article 8 of the OCCAR Convention stipulates: “OCCAR shall fulfil the following tasks, and such other functions as 
the Member States may assign to it: a) management of current and future cooperative programmes, which may include 
configuration control and in-service support, as well as research activities; b) management of those national 
programmes of Member States that are assigned to it; c)preparation of common technical specifications for the 
development and procurement of jointly defined equipment; d) coordination and planning of joint research activities as 
well as, in cooperation with appropriate military staffs, studies of technical solutions to meet future operation 
requirements; e) coordination of national decisions concerning the common industrial base and common technologies; 
f)coordination of both capital investments and the use of test facilities”. 
72 For more comprehensive information see Schmitt (2000) particularly 59. 
73 For detailed information on the Eurokorps see Wassenberg (1999). 
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Corps, which in 2003 assumed leadership of ISAF in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Constitution 
invites participating Member States to make these forces available to future EU-led operations.74 
 
C. No mechanisms of flexible integration outside the Constitution foreseen  
 
Strikingly, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe does not provide a single legal 
basis on the admissibility or not of co-operations outside the Treaty framework. 
The obvious lack of any clarifying provision may be interpreted as implicitly precluding 
cooperation outside the treaties. At the same time, one may assume general admissibility as long as 
it does not affect the fundamental principles of the Union and the established system of 
competences. Preference should settle on the second option since the imposition of a general ban of 
cooperation outside the Treaties would significantly limit the national sovereignty of the Member 
States going far beyond the scope covered by the principle of solidarity as enacted in Article 11 
para 1 TEU. This principle aims at preventing harmful action by the Member States against the 
Union but it does not exclude activities per se outside the Treaty framework. It follows that 
cooperation remains admissible provided that it respects the primacy of Community law.75 
A second question refers to the aspect of conditional admissibility. It has to be clarified 
whether the legitimacy of cooperation outside the Treaties builds on a multi-level process. 
Following this assumption, any objective of cooperation outside the Treaties would require previous 
attempts to implement the matter within the framework of Union law. In the case of failure, the 
interested Member States would have to try to pursue their aim by using the mechanism of 
enhanced cooperation. Only if both initiatives remain unsuccessful should it be possible to take 
recourse to cooperation outside the legal and institutional framework of the Union. The legal 
foundation to support this assumption in the field of CFSP is to be found in Article 11 para 2 TEU:  
“The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The 
Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual 
political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations.” 
As noted above, Article 11 para 2 TEU exclusively bans harmful action against the Union 
set by the Member States but it does prohibit cooperation outside the treaties. As a result one may 
                                                          
74 Article I-41 para 3 TCE states: “Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union 
for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the 
Council.  Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the 
common security and defence policy.” 
75 Dehousse / Coussens / Grevi (2004), p. 16. 
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not deduce any obligation to run the different levels spelt out before. If at all, this would only be 
possible by means of the stronger duty of faith in the realm of Community law (Article 10 TEC).76 
 
VII. Conclusions 
In conclusion, one may observe that the measures of flexible integration discussed above, 
contain promising elements for a more functional CFSP. However, a balance has to be struck 
between the objective of increased efficiency and strengthened unity, as well as between legal 
security and necessary ad-hocism.  
The objective of enhancing efficiency has led to significant improvements. In other words, 
not only the restricted scope of implementation with regard to enhanced cooperation has been 
extended, thereby overcoming the sole option of constructive abstention, but it has also been 
seriously contemplated to additionally include institutionalised models of integration designed for 
the shorter or longer term. Apart from a more positive connotation, these types of cooperation offer 
the advantage to be directly adaptable to the respective needs and objectives. 
The requirement to comply with the principle of unity confronts us with the dilemma that 
the underpinning reason for the creation of these flexibility instruments is the persisting reality that 
unity often could not be reached among the Member States. Likewise, the extent of flexibility 
remains a controversial issue as illustrated by the political resistance provoked by some of the 
mechanisms proposed by the Convention. As a consequence, massive redrafting and substantial 
restrictions to the relevant provisions occurred during the IGC.  
The aspect of being institutionally anchored is decisive in view of the potential impact 
exercised by mechanisms of flexibility and the Member States concerned. Only where the inherent 
link to the European Union remains visible it is possible to attribute the relevant action to it. 
Moreover, in order to meet the principle of consistency, it is important to have a clear-cut 
delimitation of competences. This is even truer since legal grounds for external action are spread 
over the fields of Community law as well as of CFSP/ESDP.  
However, mechanisms of flexibility in the realm of CFSP will also allow for spontaneous 
reactions on important global questions in case no consistent answer could be found in the Council. 
To this end, Member States may avail themselves of the instrument of enhanced cooperation. In 
addition, in the more operative-military sphere of ESDP particular mechanisms will allow for rapid 
reaction. To this end, the respective normative foundations have been left rather vague and do not 
even clarify the degree of delegation of decision making competences nor the interplay between the 
Member States concerned and several crucial functions currently attributed to sub-organs such as 
                                                          
76 Article 10 TEC states: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.” 
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the PSC or the Committee of Contributors. This is particularly striking with regard to future 
operations carried out by ad-hoc groups of willing and able Member States. 
 
By extending the scope of applicability of enhanced cooperation to all policy areas, the 
CFSP thus has great potential to eventually unify loose co-operations and deliberate coalitions 
under a more solid and institutionalised umbrella within the framework of the European Union. 
This versatile tool will bundle synergies and optimise the external profile of the Union not only 
through the guarantee of assured recourse to the internationally accepted institutional framework. 
However, in the ideal case enhanced cooperation is not designed as a permanent instrument. On the 
contrary, measures of enhanced cooperation will provide a legitimate transitional frame for 
innovative and pro-integrationist initiatives, which after having successfully passed their proof of 
value may finally lead to full integration into the Union.  
 
The already established defence agency forms part of the Union acquis from the beginning, 
although based on voluntary participation. Hence, this construction means a conversion of the 
classical concept of flexibility within the EU. So far there have been various attempts to bring 
together the existing variety of formats of armament and defence programs paving the way for a 
specific institution. In this respect, the exclusion of the relevant rules and obligations of the single 
market constitutes one of the most important challenges. The final success of the defence agency 
will considerably depend on the question of whether participating Member States may refrain from 
employing Article 296 TEC. 
 
The instrument of permanent structured cooperation pursues the objective to create the 
desired avant garde by setting up a catalogue containing predefined criteria which will give 
participating Member States an orientation for military transformation and allow them to assume 
leadership in this field under an EU umbrella. Given the highly institutionalised concept, the clear-
cut procedures and the option to suspend participating States hint at a more durable institution. 
Permanent structured cooperation is by far the most integrated and predetermined form of flexibility 
of all those discussed in this paper, and comes near to concepts such as Schengen or the EMU. 
 
One of the most striking innovations within the framework of the CFSP refers to the 
(former) concept of closer cooperation in form of a limited collective defence clause, which 
stipulates the obligation to give aid and assistance in case of an armed aggression against a Member 
States however, without defining specific procedures, institutions or competences. It should be 
noted that only the form of closer cooperation as enacted in the Draft Constitution contains 
elements of flexible integration whereas the revised clause incorporated into the final version has 
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general effect. Only the obligations to take national particularities into consideration (above all the 
status of neutrality or non-alignment) and to respect the primacy of the NATO contain remnants of 
flexibility. All in all, these approaches point at the objective of establishing collective defence 
within the EU legal framework, however without effectively realising it. 
 
The multi-faceted range of forms of flexibility bears the potential to meet new challenges 
without too much deviation from the path of Jean Monnet. The possible recourse to the mechanism 
of flexibility in the domain of security and defence neither replaces former instruments of flexibility 
nor does it preclude flexible integration outside the Treaty framework. The effective interplay of the 
new variants of flexible integration, namely enhanced, structured and armament cooperation could 
spark off an integrationist process which may allow the most progressive Member States to 
proceed. The profits could be exploited by all if it succeeds in making these forms effective on the 
basis of solidarity, bridging the gap between a policy of logjams and ambitions for directorates.  
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B-VG   Austrian Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz) 
 
CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIG   Documents issued by the IGC 2003/2004 
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ISAF   International Stabilisation and Assistance Force for Afghanistan 
 
JHA   Justice and Home Affairs 
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nr   number 
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p / pp   page / pages 
para   paragraph 
PSC   Political and Security Committee 
 
seq.   subsequent 
SG/HR  Secretary General / High Representative for the CFSP 
 
TCE   Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
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